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On Unpublished Opinions
By EDwiN R. RENDER*
"[A]dherence to precedent must be the rule rather than the
exception if litigants are to have faith in even-handed admin-
istration of justice in the courts."**
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1976 reorganization of the Kentucky judicial sys-
tem,' the Kentucky Court of Appeals has effectively become the
court of last resort for most appeals from the circuit courts of
this state. This reorganization created the Kentucky Court of
Appeals as an intermediate appellate court under the Kentucky
Supreme Court. 2 In most cases the decision of the Court of
Appeals is the final step in the judicial process. 3 However, the
vast majority of the decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
are not published, 4 and under the rules of practice, such unpub-
lished decisions may not be cited as authority in any court in
* Professor, University of Louisville School of Law. A.B. 1958, Western Ky.
Univ., LL.B. 1962, Vanderbilt University, LL.M. 1970, Harvard University.
** B. CARDozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 34 (1921).
See KY. REv. STAT. §§ 21A.010-.160 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Until January 1, 1976, Kentucky's only appellate court (excepting district court
appeals to the circuit courts) was the Court of Appeals. The 1976 reorganization renamed
the high court the Supreme Court and created a new intermediate appellate court, the
Court of Appeals. Since these name changes are often confusing, this Article will
uniformly refer to Kentucky's high court, whether before or after 1976, as the Supreme
Court and will uniformly refer to Kentucky's intermediate appellate court as the Court
of Appeals.
I In 1983, for example, there were 588 motions for discretionary review filed in
the Kentucky Supreme Court, of which 76 were granted and 512 denied. KENTUCKY
SuPREME COURT, STATSTICAL REPORT (1983). See also text accompanying note 44 infra.
4 During 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered 1,362 opinions; 181, or 13.2%, of
these opinions were ordered published. STAFF ATToRaEYs' OFFICE, KENTUCKY COURT OF
APEALS, 1980 STATISTICS. During 1981, the court ordered 10.2% of its 1,358 opinions
to be published. STA ATToRNEys' OFFICE, KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALs, 1981 STA-
TisTICs. Nine percent of the 1,429 opinions rendered in 1982 were ordered published by
the court. STAFF ATToRNEYs' OFFICE, KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS, 1982 STATIsTICS.
During 1983, the court rendered 1,240 opinions, of which 12.3% were ordered published.
STAFF ATToRNEYs' OFFICE, KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS, 1983 STATISTICS.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
this state.5 This author contends that the Court of Appeals'
extensive rendering of unpublished opinions, when coupled with
the rule prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions, pro-
duces undesirable results.
Even though unpublished opinions are not cited as authority,
they do influence trial judges, attorneys and perhaps the Court
of Appeals itself. Furthermore, there are instances of clear con-
flict between published and unpublished decisions. These con-
flicts create confusion within all branches of the legal profession.
Moreover, they leave the Court of Appeals open to the charge
that it is not doing thorough work, or worse, that it knowingly
accomplishes through unpublished opinions that which it could
not do in published opinions.
This Article first will trace the development of two sets of
rules in Kentucky: the rules governing the publication of opin-
ions and the rules prohibiting the citation of unpublished deci-
sions. Further, this Article will summarize the Court of Appeals'
case load and its practice in connection with the publication of
opinions. This summary will be followed by an analysis of some
of the problems created by unpublished Kentucky decisions. As
a solution to such problems, this Article advocates abolition of
Kentucky's "no-citation" rule.
I. DEVELOPMfENT OF KENTUCKY'S RULES ON UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS
Before Kentucky's judicial system was reorganized in 1976,6
the publication of opinions was governed by the rules of the
Supreme Court. Rule 1.310(b) stated:
If the issues presented in a case do not detail the facts and
will dispose of the law or any question of public importance
the Court may direct that the opinion not be reported officially
or cited as authority, which direction will be stated in the
opinion and shall be noted by the Clerk on the docket. The
opinions in such cases will not detail the facts and will dispose
of the issues in a summary manner. 7
See KY. R. Crv. P. 76.28(4)(c) [hereinafter cited as CR].
6 See note 2 supra.
7 Ky. Ct. App. R. 1.310(b), KRS (1962) [hereinafter cited as RCA].
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Rule 1.310(a) directed the court clerk to send copies of all
opinions to the court reporter, who was to forward them im-
mediately to the West Publishing Company.8 The rule further
provided that opinions were not to be published until the man-
date of the Supreme Court had been issued and until any motion,
such as a motion for rehearing, had been resolved. 9
When the Supreme Court decided a case and the opinion
was not to be published, the attorneys received a decision that
might have read: "This case has been reviewed by a panel of
three circuit judges and by this court. All are of the opinion
that the judgment is correct and should be affirmed."' 0 Thus,
an unpublished "decision" of the Supreme Court contained no
statement of facts and did not summarize the parties' arguments
or the Court's reasoning. Unpublished decisions reversing the
trial court were equally terse. Under the applicable rules, such
decisions could not be cited." Indeed, citation would have been
fruitless because the decisions detailed neither the facts nor the
Court's reasoning process. Under the pre-1976 practice of Ken-
tucky's high court, one point was clear: the law as interpreted
by the highest court of this Commonwealth was found in the
official Kentucky reports. When attorneys wanted to research
the law, they "went to the books," the Kentucky Reports or the
Southwestern Reporter. Unfortunately, this is no longer the case.
II. KENTUCKY PRACTICE SINCE 1976
Kentucky's current judicial system was established on Janu-
ary 1, 1976.12 The constitutional amendment providing for a
three-tier court structure in this state necessitated the revision of
the Supreme Court Rules and the adoption of rules by the new
Court of Appeals, including those relating to publication of
opinions and citation of unpublished decisions. The statutory
basis for the current rule is Kentucky Revised Statutes §
21A.070(2), which states that the "Supreme Court shall deter-
mine which opinions of the Court of Appeals and lower courts
shall be published."'' 3 In 1976, Rule 1.310(b) was revised to read
See RCA 1.310(a), KRS (1962).
See id.
10 Decoursey v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., No. F-20-72 (Ky. Sept. 27, 1974).
i See RCA 1.310(b), KRS (1962).
12 See note 2 supra.
" KRS § 21A.070(2) (1980).
1984-85]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
as follows: "Opinions of the Supreme Court shall be published
unless the issues presented in a case do not involved [sic] any
new or substantial point of law or any question of public im-
portance.' 1 4 Rule 1.310(c) permitted the chief judge of the newly-
created Court of Appeals to recommend to the Supreme Court
the publication of a Court of Appeals decision.' 5 The revised
rules also contained the admonition that "[u]npublished opinions
shall not be cited or otherwise used in any other case in any
court."16
In 1978, the rules relating to publication of opinions by the
Court of Appeals were modified. The Rules of Civil Procedure
contain the current rules governing the publication of opinions
and the citation of unpublished opinions. Rule 76.28(4)(a) pro-
vides:
When a motion for discretionary review under Rule 76.20
is granted by the Supreme Court, the opinion of the Court of
Appeals in the case under review shall not be published unless
so ordered by the Supreme Court. All other opinions of the
appellate courts will be published as directed by the court
issuing the opinion. Every opinion shall show on its face
whether it is 'To Be Published' or 'Not To Be Published."
7
The present no-citation rule, found in Rule 76.28(4)(c) of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, states: "Opinions that are not to be
published shall not be cited or used as authority in any other
case in any court of the state.' 1 8 The rule further states that
"[p]arties to an appeal may not [by] agreement dismiss an appeal
and have an opinion withdrawn after it has been issued."' 9
In many jurisdictions, court rules or statutes set forth stand-
ards for determining when publication is appropriate. 20 Earlier
rules of the Kentucky high court suggested some reasons for not
4 Ky. R. App. P. 1.310(b), KRS (1976) [hereinafter cited as RAP].
-5 See RAP 1.310(c), KRS (1976).
6 RAP 1.310(d), KRS (1976).
" CR 76.28(4)(a).
is CR 76.28(4)(c).
19 CR 76.28(5).
10 In most states the decision whether to publish a decision of an appellate court
is made by the court deciding the case, in accordance with standards set out in court
rules or statutes. Ohio, for example, employs a comprehensive set of criteria for publi-
cation. The Ohio rule states that a decision will be published if:
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publishing opinions. For example, cases that did not involve
"any question of public importance" were not to be published. 21
Under the present Court of Appeals rules, an opinion is not to
be published if the Supreme Court grants discretionary review. 22
Otherwise, the rules are silent as to when publication by the
Court of Appeals is appropriate. 23 The Court of Appeals has,
however, developed publication standards which are not con-
tained in its rules. The court utilizes a form, the substance of
which states:
[ ] Publication is not recommended.
Publication is recommended because the opinion:
[ ] Establishes a new rule of law, alters or modifies an
existing rule, or applies an established rule to a novel fact
situation;
[] Involves an issue of continuing public interest;
(1) It establishes a new rule of law, which term as used in this rule
includes common law, statutory law, procedural rules and administrative
rules;
(2) It alters, or modifies, or overrules an existing rule of law;
(3) It applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different
from those in previously published applications;
(4) It explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of an existing rule of
law;
(5) It creates or resolves a conflict of authority, or it reverses, over-
rules, or otherwise addresses a published opinion of a lower court or
administrative agency;
(6) It concerns or discusses one or more factual or legal issues of
significant public interest;
(7) It concerns a significant legal issue and is accompanied by a
concurring or dissenting opinion;
(8) It concerns a significant legal issue upon the remand of a case
from the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Ohio.
OE[o SUP. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(E). See also CAL. CT. R. 976; COLO. APP. R. 35(f); ILL.
SuP. CT. R. 23; IowA Sup. CT. R. 10; MICH. CT. R. 7.215; OKLA. R. App. P. 1.200;
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.23 (West Supp. 1984-85).
21 See RCA 1.310(b), KRS (1972).
- See CR 72.28(4)(a).
CR 72.28(4)(a) provides:
When a motion for discretionary review under Rule 76.20 is granted
by the Supreme Court, the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the case
under review shall not be published unless so ordered by the Supreme
Court. All other opinions of the appellate courts will be published as
directed by the court issuing the opinion. Every opinion shall show on its
face whether it is 'To Be Published' or 'Not To Be Published'.
1984-851
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[ ] Involves an issue of continuing interest to the state
judiciary and the practicing bar;
[ Criticizes existing law;
[ Resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
24
The appellate panel makes the initial determination whether to
publish its decision.Y In most cases, the judge who writes the
majority opinion decides whether to order publication.
26
It is not unfair to say that present practice discourages
publication. If the judge who wrote an opinion does not want
it published, for any reason, the judge simply checks the appro-
priate box. On the other hand, if the judge opts for publication,
the decision should accomplish one of the five alternatives in-
dicated on the form. Clearly, the course of least resistance is
not to publish.
Notwithstanding promulgation of the no-citation rule in
1976,27 attorneys apparently continued to cite unpublished opin-
ions. In Yocum v. Justice,28 the Court of Appeals noted that
there had been cases in which attorneys had cited unpublished
opinions to various courts in the state.29 The Justice court stated
that in future cases, it would strike the offending brief without
leave to refile if the circumstances so warranted. 0 Subsequent
to the Justice decision, attorneys evidently have complied with
the rule, at least at the appellate level.3 ' However, the major
difficulty with the rule prohibiting citation of unpublished opin-
ions does not arise in the Court of Appeals or even in the
Kentucky Supreme Court. The problem is a more serious matter
in the state's trial courts and in the daily practices of its attor-
neys.
14 A copy of this form was provided by the Staff Attorneys' Office of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals.
See CR 72.28(4)(a).
26 See McDonald, Chance of Publishing?, 3 LouisvaE LAw. 26, 27 (Winter 1982).
RAP 1.310(d).
- 569 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
29 See id. at 679.
See id.
1' The author-has found no published case in which an attorney's brief was stricken
without leave to refile for violating the "no-citation" rule.
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III. PRECEDENTIAL FORCE OF UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS IN
KENTUCKY
It has been said that the precedential effect of the decisions
of the present Court of Appeals of Kentucky depends on whether
the opinion is published.3 2 Judge McDonald has stated that
"[t]he easiest way to think of a nonpublished opinion is as a
personal letter from the panel to the trial court judge and the
parties informing them of the decision and the rationale behind
it.'133 This statement is consistent with the no-citation rule.34 The
rule does not state that an unpublished opinion is of no prece-
dential effect; it only prohibits citation of such opinions. 35 As
far as appellate practice is concerned, the clear implication of
Judge McDonald's statement is that unpublished opinions have
no precedential value in this state.36 Judge McDonald may have
underestimated the impact of unpublished opinions. It seems
that attorneys who receive unpublished opinions in cases they
have handled tend to regard these opinions as more than per-
sonal letters. It is reasonable to assume that attorneys would
rely on such unpublished opinions in their practice as a basis
for counseling clients in similar situations.
,2 See McDonald, supra note 26, at 26.
3 Id.
- Cf. CR 76.28(4)(c).
11 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
36 Judge McDonald's conclusion is the same as that of the Texas Supreme Court,
which recently held that an unpublished opinion "is of no precedential value and should
not be cited." Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983).
There is little uniformity among other jurisdictions as to the propriety of citing
unpublished opinions or the precedential value thereof. Some states do not have court
rules or statutes on the subject. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 17-116.01 (1984) (list and brief
summary of unpublished opinions kept by court clerk and available upon request). Other
states flatly prohibit the citation of unpublished opinions. See, e.g., LA. CT. APP. R. 2-
16.3. Colorado and Michigan have court rules which state that unpublished opinions are
not binding precedent, but their rules do not prohibit citation. See CoLo. App. R. 35(0;
MIcI. CT. R. 7.215(C). A number of states have rules which permit reference to
unpublished opinions only for certain purposes. See, e.g., CAL. CT. R. 977 (law of the
case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, criminal action involving same defendant or
disciplinary action involving same respondent); ILL. S. CT. R. 23 (double jeopardy, res
judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case or similar doctrines); IOWA S. Cr. R. 10(f)
(same as California rule); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 809.23(3) (res judicata, collateral estoppel
or law of the case). Ohio and Tennessee permit citation of an unpublished opinion if a
1984-85]
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IV. WHY COURTS Do NOT PUBLISH
Numerous reasons have been advanced as to why appellate
courts do not publish all of their decisions. 37 An appellate court's
caseload may preclude wholesale publication .3  Recent caseload
statistics indicate that this consideration is directly applicable to
the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
Since 1980, between 1,500 and 2,000 cases per year have
reached the Court of Appeals. 39 During this same period, the
Court of Appeals issued between 1,200 and 1,400 opinions an-
nually. 40 This figure represents nearly 100 opinions per judge per
year. Nearly nine out of ten opinions of the Court of Appeals
since 1980 have gone unpublished.
41
The volume of work produced at the Court of Appeals most
likely affects its decision whether to publish opinions, and jus-
tifiably so. Given the number of opinions each judge writes, 42 it
would be unreasonable to expect every opinion to be refined so
copy of the opinion is attached to the brief and made available to the other parties in
the litigation and to the court. See Omo S. CT. R. 2(G)(3); TENN. S. CT. R. 4(5).
Nor is the practice uniform in the federal system. The Tenth Circuit permits citation
of unpublished opinions. 10T Cm. R. 17(c). In the Fifth Circuit, "[unpublished opinions
are precedent." 5TH CR. R. 47.5.3 (unpublished opinion to be cited only when basis for
res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of case). In the Seventh Circuit, unpublished orders
can be cited "to support a claim of resjudicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case."
7TH Cm. R. 35(b)(2)(iv) (emphasis in original). Citation of an unpublished opinion is
disfavored in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. See 4TH Cm. R 36.5 18(d)(ii) (exception for
establishing res judicata, collateral estoppel, law of case); 6TH Cm. R. 24(b). Citation is
flatly prohibited in the First, Second and Ninth Circuits. See 1ST CIR. R. 14; 2D CIR. R.
§ 0.23; 9TH CIR. R. 21(c).
31 See generally Andreani, Independent Panels to Choose Publishable Opinions: A
Solution to California's Selective Publication System, 12 PAc. L.J. 727 (1980-81);
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLum. L. Rav. 735 (1949); Kanner, The Unpublished
Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386 (1973); Newbern & Wilson,
Rule 21: Unprecedent and the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REv. 37 (1978-79);
Silverman, The Unwritten Law-The Unpublished Opinion in California, 51 CAL. ST.
B.J. 33 (1976); Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions, 64 A.B.A.J. 1245 (1978);
Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CoNI.EL L.
REv. 128 (1977-78).
38 See Andreani, supra note 37, at 728; Kanner, supra note 37, at 388; Silverman,
supra note 37, at 35, 38-39.
39 See note 4 supra.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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that it is suitable for publication. Also, given its existing person-
nel and caseload, if the court were to adopt the practice of
preparing all its opinions in a manner suitable for publication,
the length of time cases remain in the Court of Appeals would
increase dramatically. Indeed, the present court system was es-
tablished to alleviate increasing delays at the appellate level. 43
Notwithstanding its caseload, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is, in most cases, the final step in the appellate process.
Although the losing party can make a motion for discretionary
review in the Supreme Court, such a motion realistically affords
little hope of review since the Supreme Court rarely grants these
motions. Indeed, the Court of Appeals makes the final decision
in more than eighty-five percent of appealed cases. 44 The fact
that the Supreme Court does not review most cases greatly
increases the importance of the Court of Appeals decisions. The
Court of Appeals' status as a de facto court of last resort should
not be ignored in determining whether and which of its decisions
warrant publication.
It is often argued that cases lacking precedential importance
should not be published. 45 According to this argument, if a case
only involves the application of settled rules of law, publication
adds nothing to the legal literature." However, there is at least
one problem with this reasoning. A case that does not seem
particularly important today may become important in the future
for reasons that are entirely unknown to the court at the time
the decision is made. The "precedential importance" of an
opinion thus cannot be predetermined by its author. Rather, the
attorney wishing to rely on the opinion in a subsequent matter
is in a better position to decide whether the opinion is worth
citing.
Some have argued that publication of all appellate court
opinions vastly increases printing expense. 47 Those advancing this
41 See Reed, From the Desk of the Chief Justice: Workload Matters, 39 Ky. BENCH
& B. 25 (April 1975); Whitmer, One More Word- Your Support Needed, 39 Ky. BENCH
& B. 20 (July 1975).
+' See note 3 supra.
"' See, e.g., Andreani, supra note 37, at 728; Kanner, supra note 37, at 388;
Newbern & Wilson, supra note 37, at 38.
46 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 45 supra.
4' See ABA APPELLATE COURT STANDARDs, Standard 3.37 commentary, quoted in
Stern, supra note 37, at 1245.
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argument further contend that there is no commensurate benefit
to offset the increased cost of publication. 48 Most publication
costs, however, are borne by the members of the bar, not the
state. 49 Moreover, several states publish opinions of intermediate
courts in large numbers.50 One would suppose that if there were
no market for these reports, the private publishing companies
involved would soon find publication unprofitable and stop pub-
lishing the decisions.
Another argument in favor of selective publication of judicial
decisions is that courts issue opinions at such a rate that, if all
opinions were published, there would be an incredible mass of
4s See, e.g., id.
41 Since law firms and lawyers purchase the majority of volumes of reported
opinions, the legal community and not the state pays most of the publication costs.
" Many states utilize private firms to publish intermediate court decisions. For
example, decisions of the California Court of Appeal are reported in the California
Appellate Reports, the Pacific Reporter and West's California Reporter. The California
Appellate Departments of the Superior Court report decisions in the California Appellate
Reports Supplement, West's California Reporter and the Pacific Reporter. In Florida,
District Court of Appeal decisions are reported in the Southern Reporter. The Circuit
Court, County Court and other lower courts of record are published in the Florida
Supplement. The Georgia Appeals Reports and the Southeastern Reporter contain the
decisions of the Georgia Court of Appeals. The Illinois Appellate Court decisions are
reported in the Illinois Appellate Court Reports and the Northeastern Reporter. The
decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are published in the Indiana Court of Appeals
Reports (prior to 1972, Indiana Appellate Court Reports) and the Northeastern Reporter.
In Maryland, the decisions of the Court of Special Appeals are reported in the Maryland
Appellate Reports and the Atlantic Reporter. In New Jersey, the decisions of the Superior
Court are reported in the New Jersey Superior Court Reports and the Atlantic Reporter.
The County courts and other lower courts also report decisions in these reporters. The
New Mexico Reports and the Pacific Reporter contain the opinions of the New Mexico
Court of Appeal. In New York, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, decisions are
reported in the Appellate Division Reports and West's New York Supplement. Other
lower court decisions are published in the New York Miscellaneous Report, and West's
New York Supplement. In North Carolina, decisions of the Court of Appeals are
reported in the Southeastern Reporter.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reports its decisions in the Ohio Appellate Reports and
the Northeastern Reporter. Decisions of the Oregon Court of Appeals are reported in
the Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals, and West's Pacific Reports. In Pennsylvania,
the Superior Court publishes decisions in the Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports and
the Atlantic Reporter. The Atlantic Reporter also contains the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court decisions. The Tennessee Court of Appeals, Court of Chancery Appeals,
and Court of Criminal Appeals opinions are printed in the Southwestern Reporter. In
Washington, the Court of Appeals decisions are found in the Washington Appellate
Reports and the Pacific Reporter.
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material to be reproduced .5  Law firms often have no place to
store the volume of decisions that are presently published, let
alone an additional thousand opinions of the Kentucky Court
of Appeals every year. The response to this point is that if the
decisions are significant, those who need them will devise ways
of storing and retrieving them. Recent developments in the tech-
nology of storage and retrieval such as LEXIS, WESTLAW and
JURIS necessitate a reconsideration of the "lack of space"
argument. 5
2
V. PROBLEMS CREATED BY UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AND THE
No-CITATION RULE
A fundamental cause of concern for attorneys and trial
judges arises from differences between the law announced in
published cases and the results reached in unpublished cases.
The manner in which one recent unpublished case was resolved
illustrates several problems created by unpublished opinions.
Carter v. Gilmore & Tatge Manufacturing Co.5 3 concerned
whether damages in a wrongful death action should be reduced
where one of the beneficiaries of the wrongful death recovery
was guilty of negligence which contributed to the decedent's
death.5 4 A brief summary of the substantive law prior to the
Carter decision is necessary for an understanding of the diffi-
culties generated by this case.
In an earlier wrongful death action, Bays v. Cox' Adminis-
trator 5 5 the Supreme Court held that a negligent beneficiary
could not share in the estate's recovery.56 The Bays rule repre-
11 See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 37, at 35, 38.
.2 See id. at 38. See also Newbern & Wilson, supra note 37, at 58-59.
" No. 80-CA-1906-DR ( Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1981). Carter eventually was
published at 28 Ky. L. Summ. 10, at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as KLS], and the facts referred to in this Article are taken from that publication.
' 28 KLS 10, at 5. See also notes 62-71 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the facts which gave rise to this issue.
5 229 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1950).
-6 In Bays, the Supreme Court found as a matter of fact that the death of Nola
Cox was caused by the concurring negligence of her husband, Henry Cox, and Kenneth
Bays, as drivers of two colliding automobiles. Id. at 739. The Court held that the trial
court erred in awarding Mrs. Cox' administrator $4,000 against Mr. Cox and $8,000
against Bays. Id. at 739-40. In so holding, the Court quoted § 241 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which provides that "[u]ntil otherwise provided by law, the action to
1984-85]
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sented a minority view and its rationale had been questioned in
various quarters.
5 7
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Cox v. Cooper5 8 faced pre-
cisely the same question that had been decided in Bays, and it
made the same ruling.5 9 However, the Court stated in dictum:
As an original proposition, a good argument can be made
to the effect that in such a case the recovery to the estate
should not be diminished at all, because if it is, as in this very
example, the wrongdoer gains back half of what he loses. A
better policy would pass what would otherwise be his share of
the recovery on to those who would take it if he were dead....
We might have given favorable consideration to adopting such
a policy had the administratrix brought the question to us, but
sadly she did not, so we must live for the time at least with
the ruling in Bays v. Cox' Adm'r... that the amount of the
wrongdoer's beneficial interest is deducted from what he has
to pay. °
The foregoing statement by the Supreme Court helped create
the problem in the unpublished opinion in Carter. The plaintiff
in Carter was the personal representative of her deceased six-
year-old child's estate.6' The decedent was killed when he fell
into an uncovered conveyor which was being operated by his
recover [damages for wrongful death] shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal
representative of the deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the
recovery shall go." Id. at 739. The Court reasoned that § 241, in conjunction with KRS
§ 411.130 (1983) usurped the administrator's right to sue when the beneficiary's negli-
gence contributed to the death of the deceased. See id. Cf. Robinson's Adm'r v.
Robinson, 220 S.W. 1074, 1075 (Ky. 1920) (husband denied right to recovery after
assaulting and killing wife).
" See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 910-11 (4th ed. 1971).
" 510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974).
19 In Cox a young pregnant woman involved in a two-car collision brought suit
against both drivers, one of whom was her husband. Id. at 532. The woman received
injuries which resulted in the death of her unborn child and required her to undergo a
hysterectomy. Id. A jury awarded her more than $90,000 ($53,660.10 for her personal
injuries and $40,196 for the infant's wrongful death) and apportioned the damages
between the defendants. Id. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, "except that
from each award for the wrongful death the amount of $10,000, which otherwise would
have been the father's beneficial interest in the recovery, was deducted." Id. On appeal,
the Supreme Court, citing Bays, affirmed the judgment. See id. at 538.
10 Id. at 538.
61 28 KLS 10, at 5.
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father, a tenant farmer. 62 The father was not joined as a de-
fendant. Instead, the complaint alleged negligence of the man-
ufacturer and the retailer of the equipment, and of the landowner
for whom the deceased's father was working.63 The trial court
sustained motions for summary judgment against the plaintiff
on the theory that both parents were guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, 64 thereby precluding recovery
under Cox and Bays.65 On appeal, however, the Court of Ap-
peals followed the above quoted dictum. The Court of Appeals
stated that "should negligence in any manner be assigned against
either parent or both parents, such finding will not preclude a
recovery.... Rather, as suggested by Cox, the share(s) of the
wrongdoer(s) in the recovery will pass to those who would take
if the person(s) were dead.' '66 The Court of Appeals ordered the
decision published, 67 and the decision appeared in the August
12, 1981, Kentucky Law Summary.
68
The defendants in Carter successfully moved for discretion-
ary review in the Kentucky Supreme Court.69 However, before
the briefs were filed, all parties to the lawsuit made a joint
motion not to publish the Court of Appeals' opinion.70 The
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as settled.7' Its order stated:
6 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
61 See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Bays. See notes
58-60 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Cox. The Carter court did not
mention whether the trial court had relied on these cases, only that the lower court had
sustained summary judgment motions against the plaintiff. See 28 KLS 10, at 5.
28 KLS 10, at 6.
67 See No. 80-CA-1906-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 10, 1981).
See 28 KLS 10, at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1981).
6' See No. 81-SC-734-DG (Ky. Dec. 8, 1981).
70 The motion stated:
The undersigned, being all of the parties to this appeal, do hereby jointly
move that this Court not publish the opinion heretofore rendered by the
Court of Appeals on July 10, 1981, on the grounds that the parties have
reached settlement of the case which cannot be consummated until this
motion is ruled upon and that, since this court has granted discretionary
review and that opinion has not been issued, it can under C.R. 76.28(4)(a)
order the opinion not published if it deems such action appropriate.
Joint Motion Not To Publish and To Extend Time For Filing Brief, Carter v. Gilmore
& Tatge Mfg. Co., No. 81-SC-734-DG.
11 See Order Dismissing Discretionary Review Proceeding, No. 81-SC-734-DG.
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"Consistent with CR 76.28(4)(a) the opinion of the Court of
Appeals shall not be published.
' 72
The Carter result obviously is undesirable in that it produced
a clear conflict between the published law and the decisions of
the Court of Appeals. Such a conflict creates confusion. For
example, any alert lawyer doing personal injury work would
understand from reading the Kentucky Law Summary that the
Carter decision significantly modified rules relative to damages
in wrongful death actions. Such an attorney should feel free to
cite the case to a trial court or to the Court of Appeals since
the case was published in the Kentucky Law Summary. However,
the unpublished order of the Kentucky Supreme Court directing
that the decision not be published makes any such citation
improper.
73
Additionally, the circumventing of publication, as in Carter,
could create the impression of impropriety. Dissatisfied clients
could easily jump to the conclusion that the court ordered non-
publication of the appellate opinion to conceal an inadequate
rationale for the decision. 74 To the suspicious, unpublished will
often suggest secret and corrupt. The Commonwealth's judicial
system and bar do not need this kind of ill-favored speculation
about their activities.
Finally, it is possible that part of the Carter settlement was
7 Id. See note 23 supra for the text of CR 72.28(4)(a).
71 Furthermore, in dismissing Carter on appeal, the Court apparently disregarded
CR 76.28(5), which prohibits parties to an appeal from agreeing on its dismissal in order
to circumvent publication of an opinion that has already been issued. See CR 76.28(5)
("Parties to an appeal may not be [sic] agreement dismiss an appeal and have an opinion
withdrawn after it has been issued."). Had the Supreme Court followed this rule, the
confusion created by Carter might have been avoided. Further, the Carter court simply
followed dictum in an earlier case and made a reasoned change in the law. This alone
would seem to justify publication of the decision under the Court of Appeals' guidelines.
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
74 Clients are not the only group which might make such inferences:
Judges are obviously caught in a squeeze between the need to give litigants
the reasons for the disposition and the need to keep those reasons brief
and informal, while preserving the reputation of the court for scholarship.
An unpublished opinion accomodates both of these, but the very danger
of this system lies in its fulfillment of the tribunal's desire to avoid critical
review by non parties, legal commentators and even other courts, who are
forbidden access by the no-publication rule.
Stem, supra note 37, at 1246 (emphasis added).
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paid on the condition that the other party agree to a request for
nonpublication. This is not a proper element of damages in a
wrongful death case.75 The defense bar was undoubtedly un-
happy with the decision of the Court of Appeals in Carter;
however, neither the defense bar nor the insurance industry
should be allowed to silence an unfavorable change in the law
by conditioning settlement on stipulated nonpublication.
Issuing unpublished opinions under the no-citation rule can
make it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile inconsistent
cases. A series of recent worker's compensation cases illustrates
this difficulty. These cases focused on the proper apportionment
of death benefit damages between the Special Fund76 and em-
ployers where the deceased employee had suffered from a pre-
existing disease.
Prior to 1983, the issue of proper apportionment of damages
appeared to be settled. In 1978, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held in Yocum v. Loy 77 that the employer was liable only "for
the degree of disability which would have resulted from the
subsequent injury had there been no pre-existing disability or
... disease."
'78
In a subsequent case, Wells v. Collins7 9 the trial court ap-
plied the Loy standard in holding the Special Fund wholly liable
" See KRS § 411.130 (1983) ("[D]amages may be recovered for the death .... )
(emphasis added). See also Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Simrall's Adm'r., 104 S.W. 1011,
1013 (Ky. 1907) (recovery is for death).
76 The Special Fund is a division of the Department of Labor which, in certain
circumstances, supplements employee compensation. See KRS § 342.120 (1983).
- 573 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Ky. 1978).
7I Id. at 650. The employee in Loy had suffered a fatal heart attack and the
Workmen's Compensation Board assessed 95%o of the liability against the Special Fund
as attributable to the employee's pre-existing heart condition. Id. at 647. The standard
applied in Loy was taken from KRS § 342.120(3), which at the time of the Court's
decision, read as follows:
If it is found that the employe [has a previous disability or a dormant
non-disabling disease or condition brought into disabling reality by a later
injury] ... and the employe is entitled to receive compensation on the
basis of the combined disabilities, the employer shall be liable only for the
degree of disability which would have resulted from the latter injury or
occupational disease had there been no pre-existing disability or dormant
but aroused disease or condition.
See id. at 650 n.3 (quoting KRS § 342.120(3) (1983)) (emphasis added).
79 No. 82-CA-1539-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1983).
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for worker's compensation benefits payable because of the em-
ployee's death. s0 The Court of Appeals, however, applied a
different standard and reversed the trial court.81 The Court of
Appeals held that "[i]f a work connection exists in an incident
which brings about or contributes to the causation of a heart
attack, then the employer is liable for a proportionate part of
the award, even if the same exertion or stress would have caused
no injury to a healthy individual. ' 8 2 This test for measuring the
employer's liability is quite different from the Loy standard,
which holds employers liable only for "the disability which
would have resulted from the [fatal] injury . . .had there been
no pre-existing ... disease." 8 3 The Court of Appeals originally
ordered its opinion not to be published, 84 but it subsequently
granted the Special Fund's motion for publication. 85
Three weeks after the decision in Collins, but prior to the
Court of Appeals publication order, a different panel decided
Wells v. Dal Camp, Inc. 86 The Dal Camp panel, however, relied
on Loy and held that "the employer is only liable for the degree
of liability which would have resulted from the subsequent injury
to [the employee] had his coronary vessels been normal. '8 7 The
Court of Appeals ordered this decision to be published. 8
Under the no-citation rule, it would have been improper for
anyone to have cited the Collins case to the Court of Appeals
in Dal Camp prior to the entry of the order to publish Collins.89
There is no reason why counsel should not tell one appellate
11 The trial court in Collins relied on KRS § 342.120(3), which was the basis for
the Supreme Court's holding in Loy. Compare Wells v. Collins, No. 82-CA-1539-MR,
slip op. at 2-3 with Yocum v. Loy, 573 S.W.2d at 650.
See No. 82-CA-1539-MR, slip op. at 8, 9.
82 Id., slip op. at 8. The court relied to a significant extent upon Moore v. Square
D Co., 518 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1974), for the proposition that "heart-attack cases fall into
a special class of their own, to which, historically and necessarily, special rules have
been applied." Wells v. Collins, No. 82-CA-1539-MR, slip op. at 5 (quoting Moore v.
Square D Co., 518 S.W.2d at 784).
83 See 573 S.W.2d at 650.
See No. 82-CA-1539-MR, slip op. at 1.
85 See Order Granting Motion To Publish, No. 82-CA-1539-MR (May 6, 1983).
No. 82-CA-1602-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1983).
See id., slip op. at 3 (emphasis added).
See id., slip op. at 1.
See CR 76.28(4)(c), which is set out in full at text accompanying note 18 supra.
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panel what another panel has done in a similar case. If attorneys
could cite to the Court of Appeals its own theretofore unpub-
lished opinions, inconsistent results produced by such cases as
Collins and Dal Camp could be avoided. As the Fourth Circuit
stated, "any decision is by definition a precedent and ... we
cannot deny litigants and the bar the right to urge upon us what
we have previously done." 9
Jericol Mining Co. v. Jones9' demonstrates how knowledge
of an unpublished opinion could give an attorney potential ad-
vantages in counseling and planning, as well as in litigation. One
of the issues in Jericol Mining was whether the company could
be enjoined and fined for misconduct by a management repre-
sentative during a labor dispute where the representative's ac-
tions were allegedly beyond the scope of his employment. 92
Addressing this issue in an unpublished opinion, the Court of
Appeals adopted the following standard for liability:
[U]nions may only be held responsible for the authorized
or ratified actions of their officers and agents. The complaining
parties must prove not only that irresponsible or violent acts
by individual workers (or by agents provocateur) occurred but
also that in some way the union acting through its officers or
agents initiated or encouraged or aided and abetted or ratified
the prohibited conduct. 93
Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals held that the
company could not be held liable for the violent misconduct of
its employees unless it "initiated, encouraged, aided, abetted or
ratified" its employees' actions. 94 The standard used by the
Court of Appeals, insofar as the proof needed to establish
Interestingly, both Collins and Dal Camp were appealed from the Harlan Circuit Court,
and the same attorneys represented the employer and the workers' interest in both cases.
Compare Wells v. Collins, No. 82-CA-1539-MR, slip op. at 1, 10 with Wells v. Dal
Camp, Inc., No. 82-CA-1602-MR, slip op. at 1, 3. Consequently, the attorneys in Dal
Camp certainly knew about Collins.
10 Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
91 No. 79-CA-328-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1980).
92 See id., slip op. at 2, 6-7.
Id., slip op. at 7 (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Eastover Mining
Co., 551 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Ky. 1977)).
94 Id., slip op. at 7.
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liability of the company is concerned, is not universally applied
in labor matters. 95 For example, labor practitioners who handle
NLRB election cases would anticipate a finding of employer
liability under the purported facts of Jericol Mining.9
6
Even though an unpublished decision such as Jericol Mining
may not be cited, attorneys may want to rely on such opinions
in counseling clients. An attorney who uses unpublished deci-
sions in advising a client may be securing an advantage for the
client should the matter proceed to litigation. In labor disputes,
for example, a company's good faith belief that it is acting
lawfully can be important. Consequently, an employer with
knowledge of the standard of liability announced in Jericol
Mining would be in a position to deal with its employees or a
union more flexibly than would employers who were unaware
of the court's holding. If such a dispute proceeded to litigation,
an employer who had acted on the advice of counsel and pat-
terned its conduct to meet the requirements of Jericol Mining
could argue that it relied in good faith on the court's statements.
Thus, the employer could avoid an injunction or damages which
might otherwise be appropriate.
There are cases in which it appears absolutely essential for
a party to be able to cite an unpublished decision to protect its
own interests. Consider, for example, an unpublished decision
of the Court of Appeals which quiets title to land in A. If A
subsequently sells the land, the buyer should be able to rely on
the unpublished decision if sued for possession of the property
he bought from A. Similarly, an attorney searching the title to
a tract of land should be able to treat an unpublished decision,
which quiets title in someone within the chain of title, as more
than a letter to a pair of litigants. The attorney in this situation
surely would include a reference to the unpublished decision in
9, See R. GORmAN. BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 326 (1977); 1 ABA, Tim DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 330-32 (C. Morris 2d ed.
1983).
9 See, e.g., 1 Tim DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 95, at 330. See also
Gabriel Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1252, 1267 n.6, 50 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1369 (1962) ("It is not
material that the fear and disorder ... cannot be attributed either to the employer or
to the unions. The important fact is that such conditions existed and that a free election
was thereby rendered impossible.").
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a title opinion. Should the attorney's title opinion ever become
the subject of litigation, the case could not be disposed of
without reference to the unpublished opinion.
There are strong indications that the no-citation rule is dif-
ficult if not impossible to enforce. There are a number of ways,
apart from formal citation in a brief or memorandum, that
unpublished opinions are brought to a court's attention. First,
a judge may know about an unpublished opinion which resolves
an appeal from his court. 97 A trial judge is very likely to remem-
ber how the appeals court ruled on an issue he decided. The
judge is also very likely to decide a subsequent case in accordance
with prior decisions of the appellate court. Indeed, the judge
may feel duty bound to do so, whether the decision is published,
cited or not. Trial judges can also learn about unpublished cases
from fellow judges, especially in Kentucky's larger circuits.
Whenever a judge has personal knowledge of and relies upon
an unpublished appellate opinion, it makes no sense to require
the judge to be silent, especially when there is an arguable
conflict between the published and unpublished law.
Judges have related stories to this author about receiving
unpublished decisions in the mail anonymously, or having them
slipped under their office doors. Policing this kind of conduct
is virtually impossible. A system in which unpublished decisions
are cited, analyzed and argued is preferable to such subterfuge.
In some situations, the no-citation rule may create an ethical
catch-22 for attorneys. An attorney who cites an unpublished
opinion to a court may be subject to professional discipline if
the violation is intentional" or results in injury to the client. 99
On the other hand, the attorney who knows about a line of
unpublished cases, but advises clients to act in accordance with
the published decisions, may not be giving these clients the best
possible advice. 1°° Similarly, the attorney who fails to learn about
97 Cf. note 89 supra and accompanying text.
" See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(7) (1981) [here-
inafter cited as MODEL CODE] which provides, in part, that a lawyer shall not
"[i]ntentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure."
" See MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(3) which provides, in part, that a lawyer shall
not intentionally "[p]rejudice or damage his client."
110 See MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(I) which provides, in part, that a lawyer shall
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unpublished cases is open to a charge of incompetence and also
risks possible discipline. 01 It would seem desirable to eliminate
these gray areas by making the unpublished decisions of the
Court of Appeals a body of binding precedent. This would allow
attorneys to rely openly on such opinions in their dealings with
each other and with courts.
CONCLUSION
The modification of the rules of practice so as to permit the
citation of unpublished opinions is a starting point for the elim-
ination of the problems extant in the present system. Abolition
of the no-citation rule could help eliminate the idea that non-
publication is a rug under which judges sweep whatever they
wish never to see the light of day. If lawyers could cite and
argue unpublished opinions, case law conflicts could be recon-
ciled and bad decisions could be overruled. Attorneys would no
longer have to devise questionable methods for bringing such
opinions to the attention of the courts. Similarly, judges with
personal knowledge of relevant unpublished opinions would no
longer have to suppress the instinct to rely on such opinons in
rendering decisions.
The abolition of the no-citation rule might create some dif-
ficulties. There would be more decisions to read. Furthermore,
there would be pressure on law firms to purchase copies of all
Court of Appeals decisions. On balance, however, the judicial
system of the Commonwealth would benefit from the abolition
of the no-citation rule.
not intentionally "[flail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably
available means permitted by law,"
"0 MODEL CODE DR 6-101(A)(1) provides, in part, that a lawyer shall not "[h]andle
a legal matter which he ... should know that he is not competent to handle." MODEL
CODE DR 6-101(A)(2) prohibits an attorney from handling a legal matter "without
preparation adequate in the circumstances." According to MODEL CODE EC 6-2, "[a]
lawyer is aided in attaining and maintaining his competence by keeping abreast of
current legal ... developments ,.. and by utilizing other available means." As one
commentator noted, "the client does have the right to expect that the lawyer will have
devoted his time and energies to maintaining and improving his competence to know
where to look for the answers ,,, and to know how to advise to the best of his legal
talents and abilities," Levy & Sprague, Accounting and Law. Is Dual Practice in the
Public Interest?, 52 A,B.A,J, 1110, 1112 (1966),
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